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Abstract—We propose a tool-assisted approach to address
process-related threats on SCADA systems. Process-related
threats have not been addressed before in a systematic manner.
Our approach consists of two steps: threat analysis and threat
mitigation.
For the threat analysis, we combine two methodologies (PHEA
and HAZOP) to systematically identify process-related threats.
The threat mitigation is supported by our tool, MELISSA, that
helps to detect incidents (attacks or user mistakes). MELISSA
uses SCADA system logs and visualization techniques to highlight
potential incidents.
A preliminary case study suggests that our approach is
effective in detecting anomalous events that might alter the
regular SCADA process work-flow.
Index Terms—SCADA, security, intrusion detection, visualiza-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) sys-tems are computer systems commonly used for monitoring
equipment and controlling processes in industrial, transport,
transmission and distribution facilities. Examples of such
systems are: power plants and power grid systems, water and
gas distribution systems, building monitoring (airports, railway
stations), production systems for food, cars, ships and other
products.
Many facilities that employ SCADA systems are critical
infrastructures. Although failures in the security or safety of
critical infrastructures highly impact people and can produce
serious damages to industrial facilities, recent reports state
that current critical infrastructures are not protected properly.
For example, according to Rantala [1], around 2700 critical
infrastructures in the U.S. detected 13 million cybercrime
incidents, faced $288 million of monetary loss and experi-
enced around 152 200 hours of system downtime in 2005.
To understand why this is so, we must look at the history.
In the past, SCADA systems were separated from public
infrastructures, had dedicated network architecture and used
proprietary communication protocols. As a result, the systems
were isolated and not vulnerable to network attacks. Nowa-
days, an increasing number of interconnected services (e.g.,
billing systems, maintenance, resource management) make
SCADA systems vulnerable to internal and external attacks.
Although companies reluctantly disclose incidents, there are
several published cases where safety and security of SCADA
systems were seriously endangered [2], [3], [4], [5].
1) Problem: The standard approaches for the detection
of malicious behaviour (e.g. monitoring network traffic [6],
inspecting protocol specifications [7]) cannot address process-
related threats in SCADA systems. These threats take place
when an attacker gains user access rights and performs actions,
which look legitimate, but which are intended to alter and/or
disrupt the industrial process in SCADA. Process-related
threats also include situations when a system user makes an
operational mistake (e.g, a user inserts a highly oversized or
an undersized value for device parameter and causes process
to fail).
2) Contribution: We propose a tool-assisted approach to
address process-related threats. The approach consists of:
 a combined methodology (PHEA and HAZOP [8]) to
identify process-related threats caused by the activity of
SCADA engineers;
 analysis of SCADA logs generated by a real-life facility
to detect potential incidents;
 visualization techniques to present the analysis of
SCADA logs.
II. SECURING A SCADA SYSTEM
We first introduce the main concepts that we use in the rest
of the paper.
A threat is either (1) an intention and method targeted at the
exploitation of a vulnerability or (2) a situation and method
that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability. A vulnerability is
a flaw or weakness in system procedures, design, implementa-
tion, or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally
triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in a security
breach or a violation of the systems security policy [9]. We
call a target any system asset that may be the object of an
attack. A system asset is any tangible or intangible thing that
has value to an organization [10].
An instance of a threat exploiting a vulnerability over
a system target is an incident. An incident may leave
traces in various data records. An anomaly represents an
unusual/unexpected occurrence in a data record that originates
from either an incident or a benign exception in system
behaviour.
Securing a computer system from a specific threat implies
taking measures to detect anomalies that originate from in-
cidents. These measures usually consist of applying various
techniques to analyse data sources (such as network data) and
deploy tools to protect the system (such as intrusion detection).
We argue that, due to its specific character, threats, vulnera-
bilities and protection controls in SCADA systems differ from
regular computer systems and should be addressed accord-
ingly. Figure 1 gives an example of a threat, a vulnerability
2Fig. 1. Example of an incident in SCADA environment. An incident is
generated by a combination of: a system target, a threat and a vulnerability.
and an incident in the SCADA context and how they relate.
SCADA systems are, as any other computer systems, prone to
threats. However, SCADA environments are also prone to a
specific class of threats. These threats, we call them process-
related threats, bypass traditional IT security controls as they
materialise by issuing legitimate commands to disrupt or alter
SCADA process, without violating communication patterns
(e.g., network traffic).
To the best of our knowledge, research has not compre-
hensively addressed the detection of malicious behaviours in
SCADA systems at a high semantic level, when performed
commands are legitimate but the impact on the system is still
negative.
We take a two-step approach (Figure 2) to address process-
related threats in SCADA systems: (1) Threat and vulnerability
analysis and (2) Mitigation controls. During the first step
(Section IV) we assess a real working SCADA deployment
and, using a combination of two methodologies (PHEA and
HAZOP), systematically identify process-related threats. In
Section IV-B1 we describe the performed methodologies in
detail. In the second step (Sections V to VII) we design
mitigation controls to highlight suspicious situations. We build
a semi-automated tool (MELISSA: Mining Event Logs for
Intrusions in SCADA Systems) to analyse logs. We use
visualization techniques to present the content of logs and
detect potentially malicious behaviour.
Fig. 2. A two-step approach to address process-related threats
III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we explain how a typical SCADA system
works. A SCADA system consists of two main domains: the
process field and a control room (Figure 3). Large systems may
have more than one control room. The network infrastructure
binds the two domains together. SCADA users control the
industrial process from the control room using computers
that provide a real-time overview of the process field with
device parameters (data about tank loads, pump statuses,
Fig. 3. SCADA system overview: control room and process field
temperatures, etc). Depending on the underlying process,
SCADA systems differ from each other. For example, a power-
related SCADA process field consists of power switches and
transformers while a water-related process field consists of
water pumps and valves. However, based on interviews with
stakeholders who belong to various business sectors, we argue
that the computer systems controlling these processes behave
in a similar way.
A. System architecture
Despite the fact that there are several vendors, system
architectures in various SCADA systems are similar and the
terminology is interchangeable. Figure 4 shows a typical
SCADA layered architecture [11]. Layer 1 consists of physical
field devices, PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) and
RTUs (Remote Terminal Units). An RTU evaluates signals
from the process field (e.g., from a pump or a tank) and sends
notifications to event collectors (Connectivity Servers (CS) in
Layer 2). CS aggregate events from the field and forward them
to SCADA users in the control room. The Domain Controller
(DC) in Layer 2 holds local DNS and authentication data
for user access. The Aspect Server (AS) is responsible for
implementing the logic required to automate the process that
SCADA controls. For example, an Aspect Directory (AD) in
the AS holds information about working ranges of the field
devices, the device topology, user access rights. Besides, the
AS collects and stores data from the CS into audit and event
logs. Various clients in Layer 3 represent SCADA users.
Fig. 4. SCADA system layered architecture
3B. SCADA users
There are two kinds of SCADA users: engineers and opera-
tors. An engineer is responsible for managing object libraries
and user interfaces, setting working ranges for devices, defin-
ing process setpoints, etc. An operator monitors the system
status and reacts to events, such as alarms, so that the process
runs correctly (Figure 3). Typical operator actions, depending
on the underlying industrial process, include commands such
as: change switch status, increase temperature, open outlet,
start pump.
Although industrial processes in various facilities differ in
the details, user interaction with a SCADA system is broadly
similar. To produce changes in the configuration of the plant
side, an engineer needs to perform changes to the AS. After
authentication to the DC, an engineer loads the AD, browses
modules and performs modifications. Also, an engineer is re-
sponsible for making process scripts that automate the process.
The content of the AD varies and it is customised for each
stakeholder.
To perform a change in the industrial process, an operator
manipulates process controls using a graphical interface. The
interface shows topology of field devices, device statuses and
real-time alarms. These notifications come from the CS. When
performing an action on a field device (e.g., close a switch), the
operator command is checked in the AS and then forwarded
to the CS which communicates with RTUs in the field.
IV. THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Types of threats in a SCADA environment
We classify possible threats in two groups: system- and
process-related. System-related threats imply that an attacker
hits computers, networks, sensors, PLCs or radio signals to
cause failures in the SCADA system. These attacks are low
level and typically occur on Layer 1 and Layer 2 of the
SCADA layered architecture (Figure 4). On the other hand,
process-related threats imply that an attacker gains user access
rights (e.g., through social engineering) and issues legitimate
SCADA commands to cause defects in the industrial process.
These attacks are high level and typically occur on Layer 3
of the SCADA layered architecture (Figure 4). The system-
related threats exploit software/configuration vulnerabilities of
the SCADA system (such as buffer overflow or misconfigured
radio network) whereas process-related threats exploit weak
process controls in the SCADA system (such as no semantic
check of engineer inputs before execution).
Some system-related attacks are not SCADA specific (e.g.,
malware attacks [2]). Yet, there is an increasing number of
attack examples that relate only to SCADA technologies: e.g.,
an attacker manipulates data readings (e.g., for a tank) and
sends misleading values to the system operator [2] or an
attacker disrupts communication in the underlying network
infrastructure by exploiting a protocol vulnerability [7]. In
Section VIII we briefly indicate related work that addresses
the detection of system-related attacks.
There are several examples of serious process-related at-
tacks on SCADA systems from the past. For example, during
the Maroochy water breach [12], an intruder managed to
access SCADA network (by abusing a radio connection) and
then used valid engineer credentials to performe a series
of malicious actions: sewage leakage, pump station lockups,
shutdown of the alarm system [12]. Similarly, during an attack
on the L.A. traffic light system [13], intruders used valid
engineer credentials to reprogram traffic lights causing jams on
major city intersections and disconnect signal boxes at targeted
intersections to slow down reparations [13].
The malicious behavior in these cases can not be recog-
nised by traditional intrusion detection systems (such as the
IDS that analyse network traffic data) because the anomalies
generated by these attacks are not reflected in communication
patterns/data, but can be seen only at a higher semantic level.
B. Identification of process-related threats
We focus on addressing process-related threats. This means
that we analyse threats that originate from legitimate system
commands performed by a legitimate user, or an illegitimate
user who managed to obtain valid credentials. We distinguish
two threat scenarios, namely (1) an attacker impersonates
a system user or (2) a legitimate system user makes an
operational mistake. Both scenarios represent potential threats
to the system security and safety. Our goal is to identify single
malicious user commands that may lead the system to an
unwanted state.
The analysis of user behavior in SCADA systems is not
trivial but it is structured enough to be feasible. There are
two distinct kinds of behavior: one performed by an engineer
and one performed by an operator. An engineer works with
a user account that is typically used by only one person.
However, an operator user account is, in practice, often shared
among several people. Also, to perform a change on the plant
side, an operator typically needs to perform a sequence of
commands whereas an engineer uses individual commands.
Our stakeholders acknowledged that an engineer is a more
powerful system user than an operator (e.g., an engineer writes
scripts that define process automation).
For these reasons, we focus our work on the analysis of
commands performed by system engineers.
Our stakeholders come from various critical infrastructures
(power grid, gas and water treatment). All these systems
use similar underlying control systems. The main differences
are in the speed of occurrences: power-related systems are
considered fast (the consequences of actions are immediate-
e.g., turning off a power supply) while gas- and water-related
systems are considered slow processes (the consequences of
actions are delayed - e.g., it takes two hours to overload
a tank even while pumping at maximum speed). We focus
our analysis on the engineer behaviour which is similar in
both cases. Therefore, we believe that our approach could be
extended to a variety of relevant contexts.
As a proof of concept, we analyse engineer behaviour in
a real SCADA controlling water treatment. The facility is
located in the Netherlands.
1) Methodology: We combine two methodologies to iden-
tify process-related threats. Those are: PHEA (Predictive Hu-
man Error Analysis) and HAZOP (Hazard and Operability
4Study) [8]. PHEA takes a user-oriented approach to analyse
human errors by building a task analysis tree. We use a
PHEA tree to represent possible engineering actions in a
SCADA system. PHEA then analyses the tree using human
error classification (e.g., action is taking too long, action
is performed incomplete [8]) This part of the analysis is
not suitable in our case. Our goal is to identify actions
that produce malicious consequences on the process, whereas
PHEA originally focuses on identifying possible causes of
human errors. To identify possible misuses of engineer actions
(on the PHEA tree) we use HAZOP methodology.
HAZOP is the best documented methodology for addressing
process safety problems [8]. HAZOP process deviations are
built by combining chosen process keywords and process
guidewords. We perform the HAZOP analysis on a restricted
domain (engineer tasks).
We implement the combined methodology in two steps.
First, we build a task analysis tree (as in PHEA). Our tree
consists of possible engineering tasks within a SCADA cus-
tomized AD. Figure 5 represents a part of an anonymised AD
of the stakeholder company.
Fig. 5. Part of the AD in a working SCADA facility for water treatment
Second, we perform the HAZOP step. The leaves of the
PHEA tree represent HAZOP keywords (such as pump 1,
filter 153, tank 5). The SCADA engineering application allows
an engineer to perform only three distinct operations: add,
modify and delete. We use these operations as HAZOP guide-
words. Following the concept of the HAZOP methodology,
we build process deviations for all possible combinations of
given keywords and guidewords. Table I shows examples how
deviations are generated. The first column of the table consists
of all chosen keywords (leaves of the PHEA task analysis tree
from Figure 5). The second column consists of three chosen
guidewords. Each keyword from the first column is combined
with all three guidewords from the second column to build a
deviation in the third column.
TABLE I
SYSTEM DEVIATIONS CAUSED BY ENGINEER ACTIVITY
Keyword Guideword Deviation / Potential threat
add a user adds a device to the list
list of devices modify a user modifies the name of a device
(in the topology) delete a user deletes a device from the list
add no
tank (capacity) modify a user modifies the capacity of tank
(e.g., the capacity of tank 5 is in-
creased by double)
delete no
add a user adds action type to the allowed
actions (e.g., a user adds ”inserting set-
point” and/or ”changing pump status”
to the list of allowed operator actions
on pump 13)
pump modify no
(allowed operator
actions)
delete a user deletes action type from allowed
actions (e.g., a user deletes ”inserting
setpoint” and/or ”changing pump sta-
tus” from operator actions on pump
13)
add no
input (status) modify a user modifies the status of input
(e.g., the status of input 2 changed
from open to close)
delete no
2) Identified threats: The stakeholder facility has around
200 unique components that can be influenced by engineer
activity. By grouping similar devices (such as all tanks in one
group, all pumps in the second) we narrow down the number
of components we have to analyse for deviations. After a
preliminary inspection, we conclude that some combinations
of keywords and guidewords are not meaningful, such as: filter
status cannot be added or deleted, tank capacity cannot be
deleted, etc. However, a number of deviations is interesting.
We compile around 20 deviations from 7 groups of compo-
nents.
We narrow down the list of deviations during a focus
group session with stakeholders. For example, we discard
deviations that perform interface layout changes but do not
imply functionality changes. On the remaining threats we
distinguish two types of threat behaviour: scripting errors
and misconfiguration. Threats due to scripting errors imply
behaviour of writing or exploiting wrongly written process
automation scripts by system engineers. Misconfiguring im-
plies setting semantically dangerous configurations in the AD.
Table II shows a summarized list of identified threats.
On all identified threats we perform a detailed analysis,
together with stakeholders, to define the cause, effects and
mitigation recommendations. Table III shows results of the
detailed analysis on example of three identified threats.
C. Identification of vulnerabilities
Next, we take advantage of the stakeholder experience to
identify system vulnerabilities. After a focus group session,
the list of vulnerabilities found includes:
 no process safety checks are in place during the manual
system mode;
5 an input is not validated before execution of an engineer
command;
 weak password policy;
 no detail operator auditing;
 only two user access levels (an engineer and an operator);
 limited separation between production and administration
(no principle of least privilege: e.g, at the same time, an
engineer has access rights to both process configuration
and user-account administration).
D. Evaluation of the methodology
The stakeholder company performed an internal threat anal-
ysis in 2006. The analysis was based on the guidelines of the
ISO/IEC 15408 IT standard [14]. The result of the analysis
was a number of threats which exploit software/configuration
system vulnerabilities because this kind of analysis identifies
only system-related threats.
To identify process-related threats in SCADA systems, we
take a higher level approach. This requires the cooperation
with the process engineers to understand safety problems
and what is undesirable system/user behaviour. The process-
related analysis can not identify low level vulnerabilities (e.g.,
the vulnerability of authentication protocols and injection of
malicious code). By contrast, the system-related analysis can
not identify high level vulnerabilities (e.g, no process safety
checks in manual mode, no detail operator auditing, only two
user access levels).
Therefore, we argue that a process-related analysis is com-
plementary to typical IT security analysis.
E. Mitigation of process-related threats
We analyse possible ways for mitigating identified process-
related threats. This is the second step of our approach for
addressing process-related threats in SCADA systems (Fig-
ure 2). By analysing the list of identified system vulnerabilities
TABLE II
IDENTIFIED PROCESS-RELATED THREATS
Type Threat Example
scripting error an engineer inputs a
value that causes errors
in the system automa-
tion
e.g., an engineer inserts a
wrong ratio of chemical
components
scripting error an engineer inputs a
value that influences
system performance
e.g., a high input value of
a chemical produces slow
system response due to re-
peated calculation errors
misconfiguration
/ functional
an engineer modifies a
device parameter
e.g., change capacity of a
tank to spoof the alarming
system and cause hardware
damage
misconfiguration
/ functional
an engineer modifies
auditing policy
e.g., turn off all auditing
misconfiguration
/ control
an engineer modifies
the range of allowed ac-
tions for a specific de-
vice
e.g., one cannot stop a pump
anywhere
misconfiguration
/ control
an engineer modifies
the system topology
e.g., some devices become
invisible, and thus inacces-
sible
misconfiguration
/ control
an engineer modifies
user access rights
TABLE III
UNDERSTANDING MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Guideword MODIFY - An engineer modifies the quantity value
of chemicals (e.g., input 2).
Cause Inside/outside malicious attackHuman error
Effects
Errors in calculations
Equipment damage
Influence the product quality
Recommendations Additional input checksTrack user behaviour
Guideword DELETE - An engineer deletes a device from the
device topology (e.g., a pump 13)
Cause Inside/outside malicious attackHuman error
Effects
Device becomes inaccessible
Equipment damages due to overload
Inconsistent alarms
Recommendations
Increase the number of access levels
Track user behaviour
Safety checks on engineer actions before execution
Guideword MODIFY - An engineer modifies a tank capacity
(e.g., tank 1).
Cause Inside/outside malicious attack
Human error
Effects
Tank damage due to overload
No alarm when real maximum reached
Damage of interdependent equipment
Recommendations
Include safety checks during manual working mode
Additional configuration checks
Track user behaviour
(Section IV-C) and mitigation recommendations (Table III)
we conclude that identified threats can be mitigated in two
ways: (1) by upgrading the proprietary SCADA software
to support additional functionalities (such as an additional
input check in manual mode or by introducing safety checks
for engineer actions before execution) and (2) employing
an independent tool to analyse data resources from SCADA
and detect malicious behaviour. Because the former option is
infeasible, as it would require vendor to develop additional
software, the latter option looks easier to apply. However, no
tool is available to detect process-related threats. Thus, we
develop a tool. In the next section we describe our approach
in detail.
V. MITIGATION CONTROLS
A. Resources
SCADA system logs represent a rich information resource
providing a complete view of the industrial process as a whole.
Logs can be so detailed to the point of capturing commands
and network messages exchanged by devices in response to
user actions. However, the size and high dimensionality of
the logs make manual inspection infeasible. For instance, a
SCADA system controlling a water treatment process, depend-
ing on the size of the facility, records between 5 000 and
25 000 events per day.
As the same underlying control system is used by different
stakeholders (power grid, gas and water treatment companies),
the logs in all these environments have a similar format.
By structure, a SCADA event typically involves between 5
to 15 attributes of different data (e.g., time-stamp, type of
operation, source component, object component, user, etc).
6Data attributes can be nominal, interval, unstructured text, etc.
Nominal attributes have a finite set of data values that appear
in the log (e.g., 4 types of system messages, 5 different nodes
in the system). The interval data type is used for numerical
data (such as continuous values of tank level) and time data
(such as time-series).
SCADA users do not normally inspect logs. The reason
for this is that system engineers lack both time and specific
tools/skills for performing a thorough analysis. Thus, a good
deal of data never turns into information. As the logs keep
traces about performed commands (e.g., an engineer performs
a change in configuration), we believe that they hold critical
information for the extraction of process-related incidents
caused by a user activity.
B. Approach
Our approach to detect malicious behaviours (attacks or user
mistakes) in SCADA systems is based on the semi-automated
processing of system logs. We aim at detecting engineer activi-
ties that may potentially disrupt industrial process, cause harm
to equipment or endanger people safety. We use visualization
to highlight potential incidents. Visualization is the process
of generating a picture based on log records. It uses tools
for visualizing log content and a human brain as a pattern
recognition tool. This concept has proved to be successful in
supporting detection of outlier records and analysis of trends
in various logs [15].
Our detection approach consists of two phases. First we
use our tool, MELISSA, to prepare the data, reduce the size
of the log and visualize log content. In the second phase,
we manually inspect the visualized log to identify interesting
events and detect potential malicious behaviour.
VI. ARCHITECTURE
MELISSA consists of two interacting components: the Data
Preparator (DP) and the Visualisation Engine (VE). Because of
the size and a typically high dimensionality of SCADA logs,
MELISSA performs two kinds of data reductions: variance
and dimension reduction.
The Data Preparator (DP) loads logs exported from the
SCADA system and performs data cleaning and variance
reduction operations. The modified log is passed to the Visu-
alisation Engine (VE). The VE performs dimension reduction
and visualization of the log outputting a number of two-
dimensional diagrams.
Figure 6 depicts MELISSA and its internal components.
Fig. 6. MELISSA architecture
The DP prepares and cleans the data format of the input
log before forwarding it to the VE. The variance reduction is
performed through data aggregation operations. For example,
we perform a time-based aggregation of an interval time stamp
attribute. This way we transform the initial time stamp into
several periods that correspond to the company’s working
shifts. This aggregation helps the final human inspection of
the log because it groups the log events in a small number
of time periods and provides a better view on performed
activities. We explain the details of these transformations in
the implementation section.
The DP also removes redundant events in the log (such as
events from backup connectivity servers) and events that rep-
resent periodical signalling from SCADA components (these
events are not caused by a user activity, thus are out of our
scope of interest).
The Visualisation Engine (VE) accepts data from DP in
a matching format and performs a dimension reduction. To
reduce the number of dimensions, the VE processes data for
each attribute and discards attributes that give no value to data
quality (such as repeated and empty-value attributes).
Finally, our VE outputs the visualised log as n2 two-
dimensional diagrams where n is the total number of log
attributes.
The final number of diagrams is decreased by a half
(since the second half of diagrams are repeated diagrams with
inverted axis).
The remaining diagrams are then inspected to detect mali-
cious activities.
A. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of MELISSA to address
threats and vulnerabilities identified in Section IV. The proto-
type is written in Java. The DP automatically performs changes
on the input log and formats the output file. For example, the
DP aggregates values of the time-stamp attribute. The values of
this attribute are transformed to one of three values: 1, 2 and 3.
These values represent usual working shifts in the company. In
our case, working shift 1 covers all events occurring between
00:00 and 08:59hrs. Working shift 2 includes events occurring
between 09:00 and 16:59hrs. Working shift 3 includes events
occurring between 17:00 and 23:59hrs.
We use the Weka platform [16] as our Visualisation En-
gine. Weka provides an environment to load, analyse and
visualize large datasets. It includes a large collection of
machine learning algorithms and a number of data filters for
data preprocessing. We use an attribute reduction filter (the
unsupervised attribute filter - ReduceUseless) to reduce the
number of dimensions in the log.
VII. BENCHMARKS
As a proof of concept we use a log generated by a
real SCADA system for water treatment. Our initial dataset
consists of 68 000 log entries, which corresponds to 14 days
of normal process work. Each log entry has 13 attributes where
5 attributes are nominal, 4 are interval and 4 are strings. The
stakeholders acknowledge that no known security incidents
are captured in the log. Also, we manually process the log to
confirm that the data is free of attacks and user mistakes. We
7use logs captured with the default audit set up which collects
events continuously through time.
Before analysis, we filtered out one alarm on hardware
connection errors that repeatedly occurred in the log. This
alarm was caused by a missing device due to maintenance.
We apply the attribute reduction filter on our log. This
means that the applied filter reduces the number of data
attributes from 13 down to 9. Three log attributes (Message
description, AD/Device Path and Source device) have more
than 200 distinct values each appearing in the log. Since visual
human inspection can efficiently track only up to 8 distinct
values [15], including these attributes into visualization pro-
cess would not add useful information. Also, without a deep
understanding of the process (which we do not currently own),
it is difficult to derive an effective data aggregation. Never-
theless, we maintain these attributes for inspection during the
later context analysis to confirm if suspicious events are actual
incidents.
Our final experimental data set consists of 6 attributes (Date,
Working shift, SCADA node, Type of event, Aspect of event
and User account). A SCADA node represents a computer
which sends event details to the log. In our case, there are
three kinds of nodes: engineering, operator and system node.
Engineering and operator nodes represent static stations where
users (engineers and operators) login and perform actions.
System nodes are typically CS of the SCADA system. This
means that all the occurrences in the process field that appear
in the log come from system nodes. Except to the engineering
node, an engineer can also connect to a system node (e.g.,
connect to the CS and make changes on PLC). We find two
active user accounts in our log: Engineer Bob and Operator
X. The attribute Aspect of event takes one of 6 nominal values
in the log. This attribute explains the character of event, such
as: change of workplace layout, change in workplace profile,
change in control module, etc. The attribute Type of event takes
one of 8 nominal values. In the subsection VII-B we describe
types of events that we found interesting for our analysis.
Based on 6 attributes, the VE outputs 15 unique two-
dimensional diagrams. Since we focus our analysis on engineer
behaviour, some remaining diagrams are not informative. For
example, we do not get any useful information about engineer
activity by analysing diagrams that visualise:
 Date versus Working shifts,
 Date versus Type of event,
 Working shifts versus Type of event, etc.
To highlight targeted incidents, we focus on diagrams that
give an insight into:
 activities of various SCADA nodes (with focus to engi-
neer and system nodes),
 time and location behaviour patterns of engineer user
accounts,
 types of events that performed by each engineer user.
In the next sections we demonstrate three suspicious situations
we found during the analysis of the initial SCADA log.
A. Diagram: SCADA node versus Working shifts
We consider a diagram with dimensions: SCADA node and
Working shifts. In this case, we investigate how the system
workload depends on the time of day. Figure 7 shows the
activity of 8 SCADA nodes (aligned horizontally) versus 3
working shifts (aligned vertically). Each point in the graph
represents one event from the log.
As we expected, system nodes (CS01 and CS02) are active
during the whole day. Also, the activity of operator nodes
(OP01, OP02, OP03 and OP04) shows that operators in a
SCADA system work all day through and their actions appear
in all working shifts. We expect activity from engineering
nodes only during the usual working day time (from 08:00
to 17:59hrs). Activity of the engineering node E02 fits this
pattern.
However, we detect one unexpected event from the engi-
neering node E01 that occurred in the late night hours. A
detailed view shows that the event represents an error message
in an attempt of loading the AD. We investigate the context of
the event during our focus session with the stakeholders. We
conclude that this event represents the only activity of the node
E01 in the log. This “night engineer activity” event did not
produce any known problems. However, stakeholders decide
to perform a detail analysis internally.
Fig. 7. Activity of SCADA nodes during the time of day
B. Diagram: Type of event versus SCADA node
Figure 8 shows data distribution by two log attributes: Type
of event (aligned horizontally) and SCADA nodes (aligned
vertically). As a third dimension, colour, we use attribute
User account. Events performed by the user account Engineer
Bob are coloured red and marked with dashed line borders in
the diagram. Events performed by Operator X are coloured
blue and marked with vertical full line border. Grey events
(unmarked areas) represent all other occurrences coming from
the system (such as system responses, device signals, error
messages, etc).
We can see that Engineer Bob performs actions on two
SCADA nodes (EN02 and CS02) producing two types of
events (SystemUser and AspectDirectory). We now focus on
the analysis of these two nodes. A SystemUser event occurs
when a user logs in to the SCADA system. AspectDirectoy
event occurs when a user performs changes on the AD.
1) Activity on the node E02: The top part of Figure 8
highlights the activity on node E02. The user-based actions
8Fig. 8. Diagram showing user activity and suspicious errors (on nodes E02
and CS02)
TABLE IV
EVENTS OCCURRING ON THE NODE E02 ON DAY A
Day Time Action Location
Day A 08:35 Engineer Bob log in E02
Day A 08:36 Engineer Bob changes profile values
in the Aspect Directory
E02
Day A 16:09 Error: NetworkMessage on E02 node
- Overflow
E02
Day A 16:09 Error: OnOperation - Expression error
at input X on data change
E02
Day A 16:11 Error: OnOperation - Expression error
at input X on data change
E02
Day A 16:31 Error: OnOperation - Expression error
at input X on data change
E02
Day A 16:36 Engineer Bob log out E02
on E02 (marked with dashed line) show that Engineer Bob
performs several login actions and one change in the AD.
When observing nonuser-based events (unmarked areas), we
see an isolated, potentially suspicious, event in the SystemAd-
ministation type of event. In a diagram, this type of event
repeats actions performed in the AspectDirectory type of event.
Thus this event is not unusual.
However, we identify several error events on the same
node (Error: OnOperation and Error: NetworkMessage). The
context of these error messages in the log shows that all
the errors on E02 occurred during one day. That day, only
Engineer Bob was logged on E02. We show a summary of
actions on node E02 during day A (Table IV). Expression
errors (from Table IV) typically mean that a user inserted an
invalid command or value.
During our focus session with the stakeholders we devel-
oped three possible scenarios causing these errors:
TABLE V
EVENTS OCCURRING ON THE NODE CS02 ON DAY B
Day Time Action Location
Day B 08:35 Engineer Bob log in CS02
Day B 08:36 Engineer Bob changes profile values CS02
Day B 08:36 Engineer Bob log out CS02
Day B 09:11 Engineer Bob log in CS02
Day B 11:09 Error: Network Message on CS02
node - Overflow
CS02
Day B 11:13 Error: OnOperation - Expression error
on device Y: Faceplate* open error
CS02
Day B 11:23 Error: OnOperation - Expression error
on device Y: Faceplate open error
CS02
Day B 12:09 Error: Network Message on CS02
node - Overflow
CS02
Day B 16:15 Engineer Bob log out CS02
* A device faceplate is the window that opens when a user asks for details
about a specific device.
 Engineer Bob made a mistake while inserting a value;
 another system user worked on E02 node under Bob’s
credentials and inserts an invalid value;
 an intruder got access to the E02 node and tried to
perform actions.
No unusual activities nor security incidents were reported
on the specific day. However, stakeholders agree that this be-
havior could be considered suspicious and promice to further
investigate.
2) Activity on the node C02: C02 is the second node where
Engineer Bob performed actions. The bottom part of Figure 8
highlights activities on system node CS02. Similar to node
E02, Engineer Bob logs in to the CS02 several times on
different days of the log. Dense clouds of events (e.g., in
Process simple event type) indicate that the node CS02 is
rather active. However, there are only 4 error events occurring
on this node in the whole log. All errors occur during the time
that Engineer Bob is logged in. Table V shows a summary of
the day that errors happened.
During our focus session with the stakeholders we derived
four possible scenarios for causing errors from Table V:
 Engineer Bob made a mistake while inserting a value;
 another system user worked on C02 node under Bob’s
credentials and inserts an invalid value that caused errors;
 an intruder got access to the C02 node and tried to
perform actions;
 a specific faceplate on device Y is previously misconfig-
ured or triggers a script error on every opening.
No unusual activities nor security incidents were reported
on the specific day. However, stakeholders note that there are
delays in opening several device faceplates in the system. The
reason for this could be a bug in process automation code.
The two suspicious situations we detected (errors on E02
and C02) represent potential threats of scripting errors by
system engineers. We did not find any anomalies that would
imply configuration (functional or control) threats. The reason
for this can be that logs were collected randomly and do not
include extensive configuration changes done by engineers.
Finally, we took another sample of logs to evaluate our
approach. This log originates from the same company as our
initial sample an covers approximately the same time period of
9system work (two weeks). The sample is again taken randomly,
after around one year since the initial log. In the meantime,
the company employed a new version of SCADA software.
With minor changes (e.g., time stamp parser from the DP)
we managed to run our tool and get visualised image of the
log content. Although the engineer activity in the log is more
frequent, we did not spot any anomalies as in the examples
from the initial log sample (Section VII-B).
This confirms that the three detected anomalous situations
from the initial log (“night engineer activity” and errors on
E02 and C02) do represent unusual engineer behaviour.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Traditional methodologies for addressing safety problems
in process control systems (e.g., FMEA, FTA, HAZOP [8])
do not consider security threats. By introducing a special
set of guidewords, Winther et al. [17] show how HAZOP
can be extended to identify security threats. Srivantakul et
al. [18] combine HAZOP study with UML use case diagrams
to identify potential misuse scenarios in computer systems.
We take a similar approach to combine PHEA study with
HAZOP and analyse user (engineer) behaviour in a SCADA
environment.
Several researches address threats in SCADA systems. For
the identification of threats, authors typically use question-
naires and interviews (such as in [19], [20]). To detect anoma-
lous behaviour, authors use approaches based on inspecting
network traffic [21], [6], validating protocol specifications [7]
and analysing data readings [5]. Process-related attacks typ-
ically cannot be detected by observing network traffic or
protocol specifications in the system. We argue that to detect
such attacks one needs to analyse data passing through the
system [5], [21] and include a semantic understanding of user
actions.
Bigham et al. [5] use periodical snapshots of power load
readings in a power grid system to detect if a specific load
snapshot significantly varies from expected proportions. This
approach is efficient because it reflects the situation in the
process in a case of an attack. However, data readings (such
as power loads) give only a partial view on the process state,
the one concerning device occurrences. To the best of our
knowledge, only Balducelli et al. [21] analyse SCADA logs
to detect unusual behaviour. Authors use case-base reasoning
to find sequences of events that do not match sequences
of normal behaviour (from the database of known cases).
Balducelli et al [21] use sequences of log events that originate
from a simulated testbed environment. In contrast, we analyse
individual events in logs from a real SCADA facility using
visualization techniques.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present a preliminary study where we address a class
of threats that occur in SCADA environment, but which was
not addressed before in a systematic manner. We call these
threats “process-related threats”. Such threats take place when
an attacker manages to gain valid user credentials and performs
actions to alter/disrupt a targeted industrial process, or when
a legitimate user (e.g., an engineer) makes an operational
mistake and causes a process failure.
We propose a tool-assisted approach to address process-
related threats. The approach consists of two steps: threat
analysis and threat mitigation.
During the threat analysis, we first combine two different
methodologies (PHEA and HAZOP) to systematically identify
process-related threats. We then organize a group focus session
with stakeholders to validate our results. By taking advantage
of their experience, we identify vulnerabilities related to
process-related threats.
Most vulnerabilities are due to a lack of system controls.
Stakeholders acknowledge that currently no control (e.g., mon-
itoring tools to detect misbehaviours) is available to mitigate
process-related threats, and the only solution would be to
apply additional system controls (which can be only done by
vendors).
To mitigate process-related threats, we propose a tool that
helps to identify incidents occurring due to process-related
threats. The tool analyses system logs which hold critical
information for incident identification, such as user activities
and process occurrences. In real life, logs are rarely processed
(let alone looked at) by stakeholders due to 1) the large number
of entries generated daily by systems and 2) a general lack of
security skills and resources (time).
Our tool can automatically process a large number of log
entries and generate visual diagrams that can then be used
by operators to spot potential incidents. We test the tool with
real life logs from a water treatment facility located in the
Netherlands. Preliminary results suggest that the tool helps
stakeholders in identifying possible problems. Although no
real incident occurred during the period of time we analyse, at
least three events were labelled as “suspicious”. Our suspicions
have been acknowledged by stakeholders and two of them
were explained as the result of scripting errors.
As future work, we plan to expand our tool to ad-
dress anomalous command sequences, rather than single
events/operations. This would allow us to detect additional
threats.
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